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he purpose of this paper is to show that Jennifer Lack-
ey's “Statement View” (SV) of testimony does not pro-
vide as strong a framework for testimony as a source of 
knowledge as the “Transmission View” (TV) of testimo-
ny. First, I will describe her arguments and counterexamples 
against TV; then I will discuss how they do not convincingly 
show that TV is false if TV is modified slightly. Second, I will ex-
plain SV and show that SV cannot be construed in a non-
reductive way; doing so would preclude its ability to yield belief 
or knowledge through means that are uniquely testimonial. 
Third, I will entertain a possible objection to the modified TV 
(henceforth TV*) which states that TV* may be reductionist. 
Fourth, I will play into the favor of SV* (which is a modified ver-
sion of SV) and assume that TV* is also reductive, and then show 
that TV* is still preferable to SV*.  
In her essay “Testimony,” Lackey presents several clear ex-
planations of various views in the current and past literature on 
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the epistemology of testimony. She first sets aside cases where 
one would gain knowledge or belief from somebody's testimony 
without said knowledge or belief being based on testimony.1 
What she focuses on are cases where a hearer “forms a belief on 
the basis of the content of a speaker's testimony.”2 She then goes 
into a discussion about non-reductive3 and reductive4 accounts 
of testimony. She rightfully rejects a view that is exclusively non-
reductive, as that would result in a view that sanctions a high 
degree of gullibility for any agent that follows it. She also rejects 
both global and local reductionist views. I agree with her argu-
ments against the former, but not the latter. I will go into greater 
detail concerning her views on reductionism (both global and 
local) and non-reductionism later, as they are pertinent to my 
thesis. Lackey then discusses and rejects interpersonal views of 
testimony (which are not in the scope of this paper), and then 
begins her arguments against TV, which I will discuss next.  
 
Testimony and Transmission 
TV states that testimonial exchange involves a speaker's 
knowledge being transmitted to a hearer.5 She then formulates 
this general thesis by putting it in terms of necessary (TVN) and 
sufficient (TVS) conditions: 
 
TVN: For every speaker, A, and hearer, B, B's belief that p 
is warranted (justified, known) on the basis of A's testi-
mony that p only if A's belief that p is warranted 
(justified, known).6 
 
TVS: For every speaker, A, and hearer, B, if (1) A's belief 
that p is warranted (justified, known), (2) B comes to be-
lieve that p on the basis of the content of A's testimony 
that p, and (3) B has no undefeated defeaters for believing 
that p, then B's belief that p is warranted (justified, 
known). 
 
After laying out these conditions, Lackey starts to argue against 
them by using counterexamples. She first attempts to disprove 
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TVN using two of them. The first involves “speakers who fail to 
believe, and hence know, a proposition to which they are testify-
ing but nevertheless reliably convey the information in question 
through their testimony.”7 Her example, which I will call 
“creationist teacher,” goes like this: 
 
Creationist Teacher: Suppose that a devout creationist 
who does not believe in the truth of evolutionary theory 
nonetheless researches the topic extensively and on this 
basis constructs extremely reliable lecture notes from 
which she teaches her students (her  motivation for this 
could be the demands of the school’s curriculum).8 
 
Because the teacher does not believe the theory of evolution, she 
does not know it, since knowledge entails belief. Lackey argues 
that her students still gain knowledge from her reliable testimo-
ny, despite the fact that she lacks belief. Thus, TVN is false as 
there is no knowledge or belief to transfer. Her next example 
against TVN “involves speakers who have an undefeated defeat-
er for believing a proposition to which they are testifying, but 
nevertheless reliably convey such a proposition through their 
testimony without transmitting the defeater in question to their 
hearers.”9 Lackey's example for this is what I will call “unreliable 
seer,” which goes like this: 
 
Unreliable Seer: Suppose that a speaker in fact possesses 
her normal visual powers, but she is the subject of a neu-
rosurgeon's experiments, and the surgeon falsely tells her 
that implantations are causing malfunction in her visual 
cortex. While she is persuaded that her present visual ap-
pearances are entirely unreliable, and thereby possesses a 
doxastic defeater for the corresponding beliefs, she con-
tinues to place credence in her visual appearances. On the 
basis of her visual experience (which is, unbeknownst to 
her, reliable) she forms the true belief that there is a badg-
er in a nearby field and then later reports this to her 
friend without communicating the surgeon's testimony to 
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him (and thus not communicating her defeater). So the 
content of her experience is reliably conveyed to the hear-
er, without her doxastic defeater, thereby imparting 
knowledge or belief she doesn't have herself.10 
 
This is another instance of a hearer gaining a belief or knowledge 
from a speaker who had neither, thus showing that TVN is false. 
I do not believe that these examples are convincing counterexam-
ples to TVN. In “creationist teacher,” for example, Lackey attacks 
a very narrow conception of TVN. She correctly states that the 
teacher does not know/believe, but still manages to give 
knowledge/belief to her students. The issue, according to Lack-
ey, is that the teacher is not the source of this knowledge/belief 
and thus knowledge/belief is generated. Lackey does not consid-
er the possibility that the teacher could actually be connecting 
her students to somebody else who knows/believes the theory of 
evolution (namely the person whose work she studied and based 
her reliable lecture notes on). If this is considered, then it seems 
plausible that knowledge/belief was passed to the children 
through a chain of testimony.11 
However, one may object and think that knowledge/belief is 
lost when it reaches the teacher, as a “gap” in the testimonial 
chain is created. Even if knowledge/belief is not transmitted, it 
seems extremely plausible that warrant can be transmitted 
(which is needed to properly believe the statement that the theo-
ry of evolution is true). Just because the teacher did not achieve 
doxastic justification does not mean she was not propositionally 
justified. Passing on this propositional justification transmits the 
warrant necessary for the teacher's students to know/believe 
based on testimony, despite the fact that the teacher does not 
know/believe. To illustrate this, take the following example: 
 
Aunt Ruth: Suppose that Billy is working on his logic 
homework while his parents  are entertaining some fami-
ly. It is still the early evening, so the only people who 
have  shown up are his Aunt Ruth (who happens to be a 
great logician) and her daughter, Jane. Billy is struggling 
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on a tough proof. The correct proof consists of the set of 
ordered steps {Φ1...Φn}, where each Φ says something like 
“Theorem X, justified by rule of inference Y,” in such a 
way that produces a correct proof of Φn. He is stuck on 
step Φn-1, and doesn't know what to do next. His Aunt 
Ruth, unbeknownst to him, is watching as he attempts to 
solve the problem. She knows step Φn-1, and knows that it 
is the last step before the conclusion in Billy's proof. She 
wants to help him, so she tells her daughter Jane Φn-1, and 
 then instructs her to inform Billy of it. Jane can remember 
the exact wording of Φn-1, but she does not understand 
formal logic. Thus, she has no knowledge or belief that Φn
-1. She goes over to Billy, and then testifies that Φn-1. Billy 
then knows and believes that Φn -1 is the case based on 
Jane's testimony, as Jane is generally truthful to the extent 
of Billy's knowledge. However, the source of the 
knowledge/belief/warrant is actually his Aunt Ruth. 
 
This example is a demonstration of how knowledge/belief/
warrant can be transmitted even when an agent in the testimoni-
al chain does not believe or know the relevant proposition. One 
may again object that knowledge/belief cannot be transmitted 
through testimonial chain gaps, but it is far less implausible that 
warrant is transmitted; for Aunt Ruth and Billy this justification 
is doxastic and propositional, while for Jane it is merely proposi-
tional. Regardless, it is still transmitted. Perhaps an altered TVN 
can better illustrate this feature of testimony: 
 
TVN*: For every speaker, A, and hearer, B, B's belief that 
p is warranted (justified, known) on the basis of A's testi-
mony that p only if A's testimony connects B to someone 
whose belief is warranted (justified, known). 
 
This allows for Aunt Ruth to be the source of warrant/belief/
knowledge in a testimonial chain. It also allows for “direct” per-
son-to-person transmission of warrant/belief/knowledge (for 
example, if the teacher actually believed and knew the theory of 
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evolution).   
Lackey's “unreliable seer” also fails to be a convincing coun-
terexample to TVN. I agree that one can gain knowledge from 
the unreliable seer in this case. But I do not believe that said 
knowledge is based on the unreliable seer's testimony. This 
counterexample can be seen in a different light, where the unreli-
able seer's friend gains knowledge because of the seer's reliabil-
ity, and not her testimony.12 He is basically using his knowledge 
of the seer's reliability in the relevant domain to justify his own 
belief, which just so happens to be a true one.13 This is a reduc-
tive model, as the seer's friend is using her as a non-agential 
mechanism that is highly reliable,14 where her reliability is 
known. This allows for true belief, justified using induction. For 
this counterexample to be effective against TV, the knowledge 
the seer's friend receives must be testimonial.15 Lackey thinks it 
is, as she writes that the seer “imparts knowledge she does not 
have.”16 However, a TV theorist would not think that this exam-
ple is one where knowledge/belief is transmitted, because the 
seer has no knowledge/belief to transmit. Basically, the seer is 
not “imparting” anything, since she has nothing to impart in the 
first place. It is a product of a reliable process, with strong induc-
tive evidence on the part of the hearer that it is reliable.17 Calling 
what the speaker knows in this case testimonial knowledge thus 
reveals a reductionist understanding of testimony (which is 
something Lackey wishes to avoid).  
Lackey then argues that TVS is false. She does this again by 
using two counterexamples. The first one I will call 
“compulsively trusting”: 18 
 
Compulsively Trusting: Suppose that a hearer is compul-
sively trusting so that she accepts whatever she is told, 
regardless of the amount or kind of evidence there is to 
the contrary. In such a case, the hearer simply is not a 
properly functioning recipient of testimony...she is so 
constituted that the knowledge in question cannot be 
passed to her, even though she possesses no defeaters.”19 
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The second case I will call “almost a liar”:20 
 
Almost a Liar: Suppose that a speaker in fact knows that 
there was a raccoon in the park this morning because she 
saw one there, but she is such that she would have report-
ed to her hearer that there was such a raccoon even if 
there hadn't been one. In such a case, the speaker’s belief 
is an instance of knowledge, and yet because she is an un-
reliable testifier, the belief that the hearer forms on the 
basis of her testimony is not an instance of knowledge.”21 
 
Basically, this is a case where a reliable believer may in fact be an 
unreliable testifier. I think that these examples clearly show that 
TVS is false. In both cases, all three conditions of TVS are satis-
fied without the hearer acquiring knowledge, belief, or warrant. 
However, it has been argued that an “audience condition” could 
be placed on TVS in order to rule these cases out.22 Such a condi-
tion should make accepting a speaker's testimony a rational 
thing to do, as it is obviously not rational to accept the testimony 
of the speakers in the counterexamples to TVS. Furthermore, as 
Paul Faulkner argues, “the idea that testimony functions to trans-
mit knowledge and justification is consistent with placing an audi-
ence condition on the acquisition of testimonial knowledge, and 
so consistent with the falsity of the sufficiency claim as stated.”23 
Such a condition would alter TVS as follows: 
 
TVS-RATIONAL: For every speaker, A, and hearer, B, if 
(1) A's belief that p is  warranted (justified, known), (2) B 
comes to believe that p on the basis of the content of A's 
testimony that p, (3) B has no undefeated defeaters for 
believing that p, and (4) B possesses reasons that make 
acceptance of p on the basis of the content of A's testimo-
ny  that p rational, then B's belief that p is warranted 
(justified, known). While initially appealing, I think that 
this definition runs into a few easy counterexamples due 
to ambiguity in terms. Many things would make ac-
ceptance “rational” while being less than epistemically 
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virtuous. For example, suppose that a speaker has a vest-
ed practical interest in lying about some state of affairs 
(like raccoons being in parks), such that the speaker 
would have testified that p had it actually been the case 
that not-p. This makes it the rational thing to do. In order 
to separate these practical aims from truth seeking ones, a 
more specific definition should be given: 
 
TVS*: For every speaker, A, and hearer, B, if (1) A's belief 
that p is warranted (justified, known), (2) B comes to be-
lieve that p on the basis of the content of A's testimony 
that p,  (3) B has no undefeated defeaters for believing 
that p, and (4) B possesses24 positive reasons that indicate 
that (i) A is a reliable believer and (ii) testifier, then B's 
belief that p is warranted (justified, known). 
 
Together, TVN* and TVS* amount to a new version of the trans-
mission view, namely TV*. This view is not reductionist, as it 
does not reduce to other sources of knowledge (induction, per-
ception, etc.). While it may include an “audience clause,” that 
does not change the fact that TV* is a view about the identity of 
testimony. Basically, the view states that testimony is the trans-
mission of warrant/belief/knowledge from one agent to another; 
without this feature, it is not testimony.  
The Statement View 
After she finishes expounding the falsity of TV, Lackey pro-
ceeds to outline SV. SV involves no transmission of belief. For 
Lackey, it is speakers that offer statements to hearers, and it is 
these statements that bear epistemic properties. The hearer then 
forms the corresponding belief on the basis of understanding and 
accepting the statement in question.25 A hearer can then acquire a 
belief that is warranted/justified/known from a speaker whose 
own belief does not have these epistemic properties (such as in 
UNRELIABLE SEER). This allows for novel knowledge to be 
generated from testimony. This view also shows why a hearer's 
belief may fail to be as warranted as a speakers belief (such as in 
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COMPULSIVELY TRUSTING or ALMOST A LIAR). Lackey puts 
the primary focus on competence of testimony, which is basically 
understood in terms of the reliability of the statement. This is her 
“speaker condition,” which is found in clause (1) of this defini-
tion: 
 
SV: For every speaker, A, and hearer, B, B's belief that p 
is warranted (justified, known) on the basis of A's testi-
mony that p only if (1) A's statement that p is reliable or 
otherwise truth-conducive, (2) B comes to believe that p 
on the basis of the content of A's statement  that p, and 
(3) B has no undefeated defeaters for believing that p.26 
Clauses (2) and (3) are basically meant to make the view 
“complete.”27  
 
This view, Lackey states, is only a minimum of what is necessary 
for a complete view of the epistemology of testimony. This view 
comes with serious problems. They are illustrated by the prob-
lems discussed earlier in this paper, where Lackey's counterex-
amples did not hold water. When we considered “unreliable 
seer” or “creationist teacher,” we saw that in the latter case 
knowledge was transmitted. The actual issue in the example lay 
in the poor formulation of TVN. In the former case, Lackey's 
counterexample did not escape reinterpretation.28 It actually 
showed that reliability, along with positive reasons, is an induc-
tive source of knowledge (which is how the seer's friend gained 
knowledge). It seems that SV can explain the “unreliable seer” 
case, but perhaps at the cost of being a reductive view of testimo-
ny. One may argue that there is no “positive reason” clause in 
SV, thus precluding it from being truly inductive. But in fact, 
Lackey herself suggests such a clause. One might reformulate SV 
to include this clause29 as follows: 
 
SV*: For every speaker, A, and hearer, B, B's belief that p 
is warranted (justified, known) on the basis of A's testi-
mony that p only if (1) A's statement that p is reliable or 
otherwise truth-conducive, (2) B comes to believe that p 
14 
Belief, Statements and Testimony 
on the basis of the content of A's statement  that p, (3) B 
has no undefeated defeaters for believing that p, and (4) B 
possesses positive reasons that show that A's statement 
that p is reliable, then B's belief that p is warranted
(justified, known). 
 
Such a view does not obviously show that testimony is a unique 
source of warrant, belief, or knowledge. It is true that reliability 
itself is not reducible.30 Thus, SV would not have been reductive. 
However, absent an “audience clause,” SV does not make accept-
ing A's statement rational. Adding this clause makes the case 
that a hearer must have reasons to think it is reasonable to accept 
A's statement (where reasonable is defined as believing the state-
ment to be reliable). This allows for B's evidence to link up to re-
liable testimony in a satisfying way. The issue is that this way 
does not paint a picture of testimony being a unique source of 
knowledge, belief, or warrant. It is actually inductive, and thus 
reductive.  
Is TV* Reductive? 
One might look at the formulation of TV*, and wonder if it 
could be construed as a reductive account of testimony. I would 
argue against this claim, because TV* is not a claim about the cre-
ation of warrant, belief, or knowledge. It  is merely a claim which 
states that testimony is unique in that it transmits knowledge/
belief/warrant from one person to another. TV* basically identi-
fies testimony with this idea, thus making testimonial 
knowledge/belief/warrant a unique type of knowledge/belief/
warrant. However, due to the nature of clause (4) in TVS*, it 
seems that any instance of testimony in the style of TV* may in 
fact be inductive in an internalist sense. After all, hearers must 
have reasons that indicate certain things about their source of in-
formation. This same issue is what seems to place SV* into the 
category of reductionism. I am willing to accept that TV* is re-
ductive for the sake of argument. Conceding this to SV* will still 
allow me to prove my final thesis that TV* is a more intelligible 
framework for an epistemology of testimony than SV*.  
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Reductionism, Transmission, and Statements 
I will now show that, even if we assume that TV* is reduc-
tive, TV* is still a more favorable view than SV*. However, I will 
first discuss reductionism. In “Testimony,” Lackey rejects global 
reductionism. This states that “justification of testimony as a 
source of belief reduces to the justification of sense perception, 
memory, and inductive inference.”31 I agree with Lackey's argu-
ments against this concept. Her first argument states that in or-
der to have non-testimonial positive reasons to think that testi-
mony as a source is reliable, “one would have to be exposed not 
only to a wide-ranging sample of reports but also to a wide-
ranging sample of the corresponding facts.”32 It is impossible for 
any one person to gather enough evidence to justify testimony as 
a source across the board. Lackey also disputes that there is even 
a fact of the matter regarding the general reliability of testimony. 
Testimony ranges in complexity. For example, suppose you hear 
somebody tell you what time it is, and then somebody tell you 
about the virtues of their favorite sports team. It seems that there 
is no general way that the idea of testimony picks out a “unified 
kind.” If testimony is generally reliable it would not make both 
of these aforementioned reports reliable. The latter would proba-
bly be skewed for its own reasons (pertaining to the speaker's 
bias towards his/her sports team). Thus, it is questionable that it 
“even makes sense to talk about testimony being a generally relia-
ble source.”33  
She then discusses local reductionism, which states that each 
“instance of testimony reduces to the justification of instances of 
sense perception, memory, and inductive inference."34 It seems 
that both TV* and SV* both fall into this latter category of reduc-
tionism (again, I am only accepting that TV* is reductive for the 
sake of argument). This factor does not disqualify either of these 
views from being frameworks for testimonial knowledge.35 So 
what is it that makes TV* a better framework than SV*? Examine 
again the first clause of SV*: For every speaker, A, and hearer, B, 
B's belief that p is warranted (justified, known) on the basis of 
A's testimony that p only if (1) A's statement that p is reliable or 
otherwise truth-conducive. Herein lies an issue between state-
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ments and reliability. It is not clear that a statement is the sort of 
thing that can be reliable. Processes are usually what are de-
scribed as being reliable or unreliable. In this way, one can de-
scribe a person's belief-forming processes or testimony as being 
assessable for reliability. They are types of processes. One takes 
count of their token “instantiations” (the set of beliefs, or the set 
of testimonies) and if there is a high enough truth ratio (of truths 
to falsehoods), the process is considered reliable. One cannot 
consider a statement to be reliable or unreliable. It is assessable 
only as being true or false; it is a token, not a type. Its type would 
probably be the testifier's set of past testimonies.36 Thus, SV* col-
lapses into a more obvious form of inductive reasoning. To have 
belief/warrant under SV*, a hearer need only believe that a 
speaker reliably believes and testifies. For knowledge, the speak-
er must actually be a reliable believer and testifier. This sort of 
reasoning has little to do with the fact that the agent is testifying; 
it is induction that is doing most (if not all) of the justificatory 
work. Maintaining that a statement is the sort of thing that can be 
reliable runs the risk of SV* being unintelligible. TV* does not 
suffer from this issue, as it imposes no reliability condition on 
token instantiations of process types. Thus, TV* seems to be a 
more plausible theory than SV*, whether or not its status as a 
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one tweaked a bad barn case so that none of the barns were 
fake, one would intuitively grant a person in that world 
knowledge (much like in “Chicago case”). The reason the 
Gettier “Barn Case” is troubling is because of its modal prox-
imity to the actual world. For this same reason, GCC is trou-
bling for “Chicago case,” because it is a reasonably close pos-
sible world. It may even be closer than the bad barn world. 
See Lackey 2011, 77. 
36. However, the reliability of a particular statement might be 
viewed as a brute fact about the statement itself. That is, its 
reliability does not have to be evaluated in a frequentist 
sense. This is not impossible. However, if this were the case, 
the reliability of the statement can have no effect on the justi-
fication or the knowledge that p for the speaker. It may in-
crease the speaker's warrant propositionally, but not doxas-
tically., as the hearer would not know anything about the 
statement's reliability. This renders clause (4) of SV* problem-
atic, as there is no way to possess the kind of positive reasons 
for the reliability of a statement in a non-frequentist sense. 
Thus, SV* would be non-reductionist and therefore false (by 
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